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that such phraseology serves only to facilitate an insurer's efforts
to recover all of its payments in one action against the tortfeasor,
thereby fostering the legislative purpose of avoiding duplicative
lawsuits.11
Thus, it is suggested that the insurer's action is not a new
statutorily created action and should therefore be subject to the 3year personal injury statute of limitations which accrues on the
date of injury. Since section 673(2) does not toll the personal injury statute of limitations,1 1 7 the insurer is afforded 1 year within
which to commence his suit. Surely, having already paid benefits
within 2 years of the injury, the insurer has sufficient notice to enable it to commence a suit in the third year.118 It is submitted that
such a result is preferable to the Safeco holding which subjects a
defendant to potential tort liability extending 5 years from the
date of the injury. Hence, it is hoped that the Court of Appeals
will review section 673(2) of the Insurance Law at the earliest opportunity and construe that provision narrowly in the interests of
equity and legislative purpose.
Edward G. Bailey

JuDiciARY LAW
JudiciaryLaw § 479: Prohibitionagainst attorney solicitation of
clients through third-party mailings held constitutional
Section 479 of the Judiciary Law prohibits an attorney from
engaging in direct or indirect solicitation of legal business.11 9 While
connection with insurer's lien).
118 See notes 112 & 115 and accompanying text supra.
See note 103 supra; cf. O'Brien v. King, 258 App. Div. 504, 505, 17 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45
(1st Dep't 1940) (stockholder not entitled to bring suit on behalf of corporation until after a
demand made upon the corporate directors has been refused); Chaplin v. Selznick, 186 Misc.
66, 69, 58 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455-56 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945) (time during which stockholder
demand is made and refused does not operate to toll the statute of limitations).
18 In Aetna Cas. & Sur. Div. v. Sandy Hill Corp., 54 App. Div. 2d 222, 388 N.Y.S.2d
162 (3d Dep't 1976), a worker's compensation case cited by the Safeco court, Justice Sweeney stated that "it is significant that the plaintiff delayed some eight months before bringing the action and had it acted diligently there was ample time to commence the action
within the statutory period." Id. at 224, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 164. The Aetna court dismissed the
complaint as barred by the statute of limitations. Id.
n9 Section 479 of the Judiciary Law provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person or his agent, employee or any person acting on
his behalf, to solicit or procure through solicitation either directly or indirectly
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this section has been held unconstitutional as applied to direct
mail solicitation of prospective clients,120 it has been unclear
whether solicitation of clients through materials sent to third
parties is also constitutionally protected."" Recently, in In re
legal business, or to solicit or procure through solicitation a retainer, written or
oral, or any agreement authorizing an attorney to perform or render legal services,
or to make it a business so to solicit or procure such business, retainers or
agreements.
N.Y. JuD. LAW § 479 (McKinney 1968). Proscription of attorney solicitation of clients has its
roots in ancient law and English common law. Note, Attorney Solicitation of Clients:Proposed Solutions, 7 HOFSTRA L. Rv. 755, 757 (1979). Another historical ground for such
proscription was the prevalent medieval fear of the inherent evilness of lawsuits. See id.
Several reasons also have been given for the retention of the rules regulating legal advertising and solicitation. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETmcs 212 (1953). Considerations allegedly contributing to this retention include the overcommercialization of the profession, the probability
that advertising attorneys will use unscrupulous methods to "make good their extravagant
inducements," "the tendency of advertising and solicitation to [cause unnecessary] litigation," and the negative effect upon the uneducated of "alluring assurances by the advertisers. See id.; Note, supra, at 757.
One exception to New York's nonsolicitation rule has been carved in class action cases,
where "solicitation is an appropriate integral and statutorily recognized part of the proceeding." Vallone v. Delpark Equities, Inc., 95 Misc. 2d 161, 165, 407 N.Y.S.2d 121, 125 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1978); see CPLR 904 (1976). Additionally, an attorney may obtain cases
through the good will efforts of friends and neighbors, In re Kreisel, 21 App. Div. 2d 431,
433, 250 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1003 (1st Dep't 1964) (per curiam), absent an arrangement to solicit
such business. In re Schneider, 22 App. Div. 2d 231, 233, 254 N.Y.S.2d 836, 838 (1st Dep't
1964) (per curiam); see In re Lebowitz, 67 App. Div. 2d 240, 241, 414 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (2d
Dep't 1979) (per curiam); In re Entes, 39 App. Div. 2d 182, 182-83, 333 N.Y.S.2d 292, 293
(1st Dep't 1972) (per curiam).
110 In re Koffier, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 144, 412 N.E.2d 927, 930, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981). In Koffler, lawyers mailed letters to individual real estate
owners and to a number of real estate brokers, suggesting that the addressees employ their
services in connection with the disposition of real property. 51 N.Y.2d at 143, 412 N.E.2d at
929, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 873-74. In determining that solicitation by direct mail addressed to
potential clients cannot be proscribed, the Court of Appeals refused to make a substantive
distinction between advertising and solicitation. Id. at 146, 412 N.E.2d at 931, 432 N.Y.S.2d
at 875. The Court stated that any semantic difference between the two terms does not justify "ignor[ing] the strong societal and individual interest in the free dissemination of truthful price information as a means of assuring informed and reliable decision making." Id. at
146, 412 N.E.2d at 931, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 875. Recognizing that there is nothing inherently
wrong with a lawyer's desire to earn fees, the Court suggested that the legal profession
should be permitted to advertise in the manner allowed for other businesses and professions. See id. at 146-47, 412 N.E.2d at 931, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 876; cf. Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368-72 (1977) (advertisement of attorney's fees does not undermine true
professionalism). But see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978) (inperson solicitation may be regulated pursuant to a state's "special responsibility" to maintain professional standards).
121 Judge Meyer, in his opinion in In re Koffler, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432
N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981), expressly declined to determine the
validity of solicitation through third-party mailings. 51 N.Y.2d at 144, 412 N.E.2d at 930,
432 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
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Greene,'22 the Court of Appeals held that section 479 constitutionally proscribes an attorney's solicitation of clients by direct mail
addressed to real estate brokers. 12 3
In Greene, a disciplinary proceeding was instituted against an
attorney who had mailed approximately one thousand fliers to various real estate brokers 124 in the hope that they would refer prospective clients to him. 125 A referee found the attorney in violation
of section 479 of the Judiciary Law, 12 but imposed no sanction.127
The attorney, relying upon the recent Court of Appeals decision in
In re Koffler, 12 8 which found the prohibition against direct mailing
to prospective clients to be unconstitutional,2 9 requested exoneration. 1 0 The Appellate Division, Second Department, denied this
request, holding that solicitation of clients through third-party
mailings is prohibited by section 479 of the Judiciary Law and is
not constitutionally protected.' 3 '
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed,3 2 construing the
language of section 479 as proscribing third-party mailings' and
finding such proscription constitutionally permissible.1ss Writing
for the majority,3 5 Judge Meyer maintained that the restriction
12 54 N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d 390, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1981).
123 Id. at 120-21, 429 N.E.2d at 391, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
124Id. at 121, 429 N.E.2d at 391, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 884. The fliers read in pertinent part
that " 'ALAN L GREENE offers your client full legal representation on any and all property transactions for just $335 ....
By recommending the services of ALAN I. GREENE,
you, the realtor, will save your client time and money-one of the main reasons they [sic]
called on you!"' Id.
125 Id.

126 Id. at 122, 429 N.E.2d at 391, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 884. In addition to finding that
Greene violated Section 479 of the Judiciary Law, the referee determined that the lawyer
violated section DR2-103(A) of the New York State Bar Association Code of Professional
Responsibility. Id., 429 N.E.2d at 391, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 884. Inquiry into the scope of this
provision, however, is unnecessary because the Code cannot limit or expand the effect of a
legislative statute. Id. at 125, 429 N.E.2d at 393, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 886; see People v. La
Carruba, 46 N.Y.2d 658, 663, 389 N.E.2d 799, 802, 416 N.Y.S.2d 203, 206 (1979).
12 54 N.Y.2d at 122, 429 N.E.2d at 392, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
11 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026
(1981); note 120 supra.
129 51 N.Y.2d at 143, 412 N.E.2d at 929, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
1O 54 N.Y.2d at 122, 429 N.E.2d at 392, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
"1 78 App. Div. 2d 131, 133, 433 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854 (2d Dep't 1980) (per curiam).
.32 54 N.Y.2d at 129, 429 N.E.2d at 396, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
US Id. at 125, 429 N.E.2d at 393, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
1- Id. at 121, 429 N.E.2d at 391, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
135 Judge Meyer was joined in the majority opinion by Judges Gabrielli, Jasen, Jones,
and Wachtler. Judge Fuchsberg dissented in an opinion in which Chief Judge Cooke
concurred.
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against the mailings to brokers was a control of the manner, and
not the content, of lawyer advertising.136 Thus, the court concluded, as a reasonable regulation of the manner of speech, it is
constitutionally permissible.13 7 Furthermore, Judge Meyer empha-

sized that even if the statute were deemed to be a control of speech
content,1 38 there was a "substantial governmental interest" in
averting attorney-client conflicts of interest and an absence of any
"less restrictive alternative" which could be used to prevent such
conflicts. 139 Finally, third-party mailings, in the Court's view, involve the element of in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain which
the Supreme Court already has determined cannot survive consti4
tutional scrutiny.'

186
187

54 N.Y.2d at 126-27, 429 N.E.2d at 394, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
Id. at 127, 429 NE.2d at 394, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 887. A governmental regulation of the

time, place, or manner of speech is constitutionally permissible as long as the restriction is
reasonable. E.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1972); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941); People v. Remeny, 40 N.Y.2d 527, 529-30, 355 N.E.2d
375, 377, 387 N.Y.S.2d 415, 416-17 (1976); see Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980); People v. Mobil Oil Corp., 48 N.Y.2d 192, 200, 397
N.E.2d 724, 729, 422 N.Y.S.2d 33, 38 (1979). Different criteria, however, are used to determine the validity of a law which totally prohibits the content of speech. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977); note 138 infra.
1 54 N.Y.2d at 127, 429 N.E.2d at 394, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 887. A four-part analysis
should be employed in cases where the government has imposed a restriction on the content
of commercial speech. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980). First, for commercial speech to be protected by the first amendment, it
"must concern lawful activity and not be misleading." Id. Second, the governmental interest
in regulating the speech must be "substantial." Id. If these two requirements are met, then
it must be found that the "regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted."
Id. Lastly, there should not be any less restrictive alternatives to the adopted regulation.
See id.
139 54 N.Y.2d at 127, 429 N.E.2d at 395, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 888. Judge Meyer illustrated
the conflict of interest problems which could arise if mailings to realtors were permitted. Id.
at 129, 429 N.E.2d at 396, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 889. The Court noted, for example, that an
attorney might view marketability of title in a different light because he knows that the
referring broker will not receive a commission unless title closes. Id. Judge Meyer also
stated that there is a probability that the lawyer will not negotiate the realtor's commission
"to the lowest possible level." Id. Finally, the Court observed that the attorney might fail to
scrutinize carefully the broker's conduct in bringing about the sale. Id.
1,0 Id. at 128, 429 N.E.2d at 395, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 888; see In re Koffler, 51 N.Y.2d 140,
145 n.2, 412 N.E.2d 927, 930 n.2, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 n.2, cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026
(1981). The in-person solicitation issue was decided by the Supreme Court in Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). In Ohralik, an attorney, after learning of an
automobile accident, approached two injured girls offering to represent them. Id. at 449-51.
The girls agreed to a contingent fee arrangement. Id. at 450-51. The Court decided that
such in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain will result in disciplinary action against the
attorney if important governmental interests need to be protected. See id. at 449. These
interests include the obligations to maintain professional standards, id. at 460, to protect
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Dissenting, Judge Fuchsberg maintained that a mailing would
prove less difficult to police than the in-person solicitation which
has gained limited acceptance in the Supreme Court.141 Moreover,
the dissent asserted, permitting a Greene-type mailing would be an
additional step toward the improvement of referral practices which
have become inadequate. 14 2 Finally, Judge Fuchsberg, apparently
assuming a content restriction, concluded that the restrictions on
the advertising of legal services were unreasonable143 and, thus, denied the constitutional protection that the Supreme Court has accorded commercial speech. 44
It is submitted that the Greene Court erred in denying constitutional protection to third-party mailings by attorneys. By limiting first amendment protection of such commercial speech, 145 the
consumers engaged in commercial transactions, id., and to prevent "fraud, undue influence,
intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious conduct,'" id. at 462.
The Ohralik decision has been criticized on the ground that the Court failed to consider
any "less restrictive" means of regulating in-person solicitation. Reich, Preventing Deception in Commercial Speech, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 775, 789 (1979). For a brief discussion of the
extensive in-person solicitation which occurs in the personal injury field, and the part that
contingent fee arrangements play in causing such solicitation, see F. MAcKMNON, CoNMNGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 202-03 (1964). Since Ohralik was decided, most courts con-

sidering the in-person solicitation issue have concluded that such conduct can be prohibited.
Murdock & Linenberger, Legal Advertising and Solicitation,16 LAND & WATER L. Rzv. 627,
644 & n.111 (1981).
141 54 N.Y.2d at 131, 429 N.E.2d at 397, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 890 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting);
see note 140 supra.
142 54 N.Y.2d at 132-33, 429 N.E.2d at 398, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 891 (Fuchsberg,
J.,
dissenting).
14S Id. at 136, 429 N.E.2d at 400, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). Judge
Fuchsberg observed that the use of third-party mailings is a "more targeted" and "more
cost-efficient" method of conveying a "fair and truthful message . . .to the attention of
those to whom it would be most useful." Id. at 132, 429 N.E.2d at 398, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 891
(Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
14
Id. at 130, 429 N.E.2d at 396, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 889. (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). The
dissent contended that the Supreme Court, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978), did not intend an absolute ban on in-person solicitation. 54 N.Y.2d at 131, 429
N.E.2d at 397, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 890 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). Judge Fuchsberg opined that
the words in Ohralik were "self-limiting" insofar as they prohibit attorney solicitation of
clients" 'in person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the
State has a right to prevent.'" Id. at 131, 429 N.E.2d at 397, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 890 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978))
(emphasis added); see note 140 supra.
14 The constitutional protection afforded to commercial speech developed slowly. In
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1951), and Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
52, 54 (1942), the Court denied first amendment protection in situations where the speech
involved could be characterized as "commercial." At other times, the Court emphasized that
the particular speech being protected was not" 'purely commercial advertising."' New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (quoting Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
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Court has sacrificed the public's right to make informed and reliable decisions as to the selection of counsel. 4" Indeed, it appears
that the Court has attempted to slow the recent trend toward lib52, 54 (1942)); see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 533 (1945). Significantly, the Supreme
Court, in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975), recognized that first amendment
scrutiny should be given to certain speech, whether it is labelled "commercial," "commercial
advertising," or "solicitation." In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Supreme Court finally concluded that commercial speech is protected by the first amendment, but that it could also be regulated. Id. at
770; see notes 137-138 supra. One judge has suggested that the courts should not inquire
into the level of protection to be accorded commercial speech since one kind of speech need
not be preferred over another. Fuchsberg, Commercial Speech: Where It's At, 46 BROOxLuN
L. Rav. 389, 391 (1980) (citing People v. Remeny, 40 N.Y.2d 527, 531, 355 N.E.2d 375, 378,
387 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417-18 (1976) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring)). Justice Rehnquist, however,
has contended that "the Court unlocked a Pandora's Box when it 'elevated' commercial
speech to the level of traditional political speech by according it First Amendment protection." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 598 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The constitutional protection accorded commercial speech was extended to the lawyer
advertising area in Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), wherein it was held that
an attorney's truthful newspaper advertisement of the "availability and terms of routine
legal services" could not be prohibited. Id. at 384. The protection was further extended to
organizations which encouraged individuals to obtain legal assistance in the assertion of
their political or nonpolitical rights. E.g., UMW, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389
U.S. 217, 222-23 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377
U.S. 1, 8 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 437 (1963); see United Transp. Union v.
State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971). See generally L. DEITcH & D. WasNsTzsa,
PREPAm LEAL SERvicEs (1976). Additionally, direct mail solicitation by an attorney, who is
not seeking pecuniary gain, on behalf of a nonprofit organization that "engages in litigation
as a vehicle for effective political expression and association" is constitutionally protected
commercial speech. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431-32 (1978).
'4, The commercial speech protection of the first amendment extends not only to the
speaker, but also to the recipient of the communication. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972). The "free flow of commercial information" is essential to the
public's ability to make informed economic decisions. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976); cf. Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) ("consumer's concern for the free flow of commercial speech
...

may be ...

keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue"). Indeed, one com-

mentator has contended that the Supreme Court, in permitting certain lawyer advertising,
has focused more on the need of individuals to receive information than on the right of
attorneys to disseminate it. See Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty
to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1186 (1972). Thus, unnecessary restrictions on a lawyer's ability to advertise or solicit clients ultimately may leave the consumer unable to find the right lawyer at the right price. See Dement, PrepaidLegal Services: A Review of Theory and Practice,30 BAYLOR L. REV. 625, 631-32 (1978). Furthermore,
limitations on the opportunity of lawyers to solicit business discourage competition among
them, thereby destroying the potential for higher quality work at lower prices. L. ANDREws,
BrTH OF A SALEsMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SomcrrATiON 85 (1980); Brosnahan & An-

drews, Regulation of Lawyer Advertising: In the PublicInterest?,46 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 423,
436 (1980); see Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 377 (1977).
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eralizing the right of attorneys to engage in advertising as a
147
method of obtaining new clients.

While it is recognized that there are legitimate and important
state interests to be protected by regulating solicitation of clients

by attorneys, 148 it is submitted that an absolute ban on third-party

mailings is an undesirable solution to the mere potential abuse of
commercial speech.1 49 Instead, an appropriate solution to the solicitation problem would be to require attorneys to file a copy of each
advertisement with an overseeing committee.15 0 In addition, extensive guidelines, regulating the type of information permissible in
such mailings, could be promulgated by the committee.1 51 In this
way, the legitimate concerns raised by the Court would be allayed. 152 Until the Supreme Court clarifies the extent to which attorneys may advertise for new clients, however, there will continue
to be confusion regarding the latitude attorneys have in such
1 53
pursuits.
Kevin F. Cavaliere
147
148

See note 145 supra.
See In re Koffier, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 148, 412 N.E.2d 927, 932, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872, 877

(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981); note 140 supra.
149 But see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 466 (1978) (actual harm need
not be proved in personal solicitation cases).
150 See N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1981, at 16, col. 4 (amending [1981] 22 N.Y.C.R. § 691.22).
1 It is suggested that the appropriate committee might require an attorney to include
some kind of warning or disclaimer in his or her solicitation letters. See Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). Additionally, the committee could mandate that the face
of the envelope be stamped with the words "[a]dvertising content." See Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct, 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1231-32 (S.D. Iowa 1981). Such
regulations, it is submitted, are clearly less restrictive than a total prohibition of third-party
mailings.
"I See notes 139 & 140 and accompanying text supra.
53 For a discussion of the major Supreme Court cases concerning legal advertising and
solicitation, see note 145 supra. It has been argued that most of these decisions have been
ineffective in creating clear guidelines which would aid the states in structuring regulations
in the advertising and solicitation area. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 440-46 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). A number of questions indicative of the lack of workable guidelines have arisen. See L. ANDREWS, supra note 146, at 62. One such issue is whether a letter
mailed to a limited number of potential clients should be considered advertising or solicitation. Another unsettled issue is whether personal solicitation for pecuniary gain is permissible if it is "noncoercive." Also controversial is whether and when freedom of association
should be considered. Id.
The difficulties engendered by the Supreme Court's failure to enunciate specific standards are evidenced by conflicting state court decisions on the permissibility of mailing solicitation materials directly to prospective clients. Compare In re Koffier, 51 N.Y.2d 140,
144, 412 N.E.2d 927, 930, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981)
and Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933, 933-34 (Ky. 1978) (per curiam) with
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Although failure to ensure that defendant is aware of risks inherent in joint representationis error, withdrawal of guilty plea is
permitted only if defendant demonstrates significant possibility
of conflict of interest
Because of the potential for confficts of interest, a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel15 may be violated when his attorney also represents a codeFlorida Bar v. Schreiber, 407 So.2d 595, 598-600 (Fla. 1981) and Allison v. Louisiana State
Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d 489, 496 (La. 1978). Because of this kind of confusion, it is hoped that
the Supreme Court will soon devise clear standards which will allow direct or indirect solicitation and prevent potential abuse. Note, supra note 119, at 774. For a discussion of various
proposals which, without absolute prohibition, purport to protect the public from the potential harms of in-person solicitation, see id. at 775-77.
I" The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. This provision has been held to guarantee to criminal defendants the right to
effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). In
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970), the Supreme Court enunciated a standard for measuring whether effective assistance of counsel has been afforded a defendant.
The McMann Court stated that a court should not examine retrospectively the correctness
of counsel's advice, but should consider "whether that advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id. at 771. One commentator has suggested that a standard of "reasonable competence" coupled with proof of "lack of prejudice"
would improve counsel's performance in criminal cases. See Note, CriminalLaw - Competence, Prejudice, and the Right to "Effective" Assistance of Counsel, 60 N.C.L. Rav. 185,
192 (1981). See generally Alpert, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Exchange Theory, 17
CiuM. L. BuLL. 381, 384-88 (1981); Schwarzer, Dealing With Incompetent Counsel-The
Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARv. L. Rv. 633, 633-41 (1980).
Although the Supreme Court has held that the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies in state proceedings by virtue of the fourteenth amendment, Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932), New York has granted this right through its own constitutional and statutory provisions. People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 151, 193 N.E.2d 628,
629, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842-43 (1963); see People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 328, 239 N.E.2d
537, 538-39, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665 (1968); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; CPL § 210.15(2) (1971); cf.
People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 335-36, 320 N.E.2d 625, 629, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881, 887 (1974)
(right to counsel given broader scope under New York provisions than under federal constitution). See generally Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Protection of Defendant's Rights: The Case of New York, 1960-1978, 28 BuFFALo L. Rav. 157, 178-86 (1979).
Nearly 40 years ago, the Court of Appeals held that denial of a defendant's fundamental
right to effective assistance of counsel in the preparation of his case is cause for reversal.
People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 483, 53 N.E.2d 356, 357 (1944). In People v. Blake, 35
N.Y.2d 331, 320 N.E.2d 625, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1974), the Court described the protections
afforded to criminal defendants in the area of representation:
An accused or defendant may have the right to a lawyer generally to advise him,
represent him, or act as an attorney in his behalf. An accused or defendant may
have the right to have access to his lawyer or that his lawyer be allowed access to
him. Lastly, an accused or defendant may be entitled specially to have a lawyer to

